


































































This research is based on a widely held belief that resource-abundant economies grow less
than other economies. As seen in
Figure 1, this conviction is supported by a simple observation of the growth rate in these























Figure 1: Natural Resource Abundance and GrowthTheir results, shown in Table 1
1, indicate that there is a negative relationship between
resource abundance --measured as the share of primary exports to the gross national product
(GNP)-- and growth, which is measured as the growth rate for the gross domestic product (GDP)
per economically active population. An increase in a country's primary exports equivalent to 1% of
the GNP reduces its growth rate between 0.07% and 0.10%. In Table 2 we present some examples
of this finding, to illustrate the important impact these results have: Tunisia will grow 0.48% to
1.03% less than a country with similar income, investment rate, external sector rules and rule of
law, but which has no primary exports. This number can be as high as 3.8% to 5.4% for countries
like Zambia.
Table 1: Results from Sachs and Warner
Results from Sachs and Warner [8]
Dependet Variable: Average Annual GDP Growth Rate (1970-89)
 a
Log. GDP 70
b -.0011 -.0096 -.0142 -.0179
(0.55) (-5.16) (-7.77) (-8.82)
Prim. Exp./GNP 70
c -.0943 -.0696 -.0729 -.1026
(-4.75) (-4.55) (-0.242) (-6.89)
Years Open 70-89









Growth in Terms of Trade
g .0009
(1.85)
Source: Sachs and Warner [8]
a  Average growth rate for the GDP per economically active population.
b  Logarithm of the GDP per economically active population in 1970.
c  Share of Primary exports to GNP in 1970.
d  Percentage of years open in the period of 1970-1989.
e  Average of the period of the logarithm of the investment to output ratio.
f  Index that measures the rule of law.
g  Average growth rate for the terms of trade.
                                               
1 The coefficients are the scaling of the coefficients in Table 1 in Sachs and Warner [8]. See Sachs and Warner [8] for a
detailed description of the variables.Table 2: Sample Effects
Sample Position Country  Effect
1% India -0.11 to -0.16
U. S. -0.09 to -0.13
50% Tunisia -0.72 to -1.03
Ecuador -0.48 to -0.81
99% Malaysia -2.5 to -3.6
Guyana -3.5 to -5.0
Zambia -3.8 to -5.4
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Table 1.
However, there has been recent literature suggesting evidence to the contrary. For example,
Davis [3] finds that natural-resource abundant countries have higher social indicators than other
countries, controlling by income. In addition, these countries have higher growth rates for those
indicators.
In this paper we further explore the “resource curse” using alternative approaches. We show
that the results from Sachs and Warner are not robust for small changes in the econometric
procedure. Nevertheless, the effect continues to exist in the cross-sectional, therefore, in the last
section of the paper we concentrate on explaining why it remains.
In particular, we argue that in the 70´s commodity prices were high, which led developing
countries to use them as collateral for debt
2. The 80’s saw an important fall of those prices, leaving
developing countries with an important amount of debt and a low flow of foreign resources to pay
them. Thus, in the sample, the cruse (low growth) looks close to a debt-overhang problem.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we explain the problems associated we
growth regressions. Then in Section 2, we reestimate the findings of the literature, using alternative
approaches. Section 3 reviews different alternative explanations for the findings. Finally, Section 4
presents our conclusions.
                                               
2 We are not saying that there was an explicit use of them as collateral, but most creditors gave loans under the
assumption that these countries will have funds to pay back based on their resource wealth.1. The Problems of Estimating the “Resource Curse”
The empirical literature on growth starts from an estimation of the form:
t i i t i t i t i t i X y y y , , , , , ln ln ln e h b a t t + + + = - - - Eq 1
where yi,t represents output for country i at period t, X represents a series of variables that explain
growth, hi is a country specific effect, and ei,t represents the error term.
In Sachs and Warner [8], this estimation is done using the total GDP growth as an
independent variable for a cross-section of countries. These two issues --the use of total GDP and
the use of a cross-section data-- may have an impact on the coefficients estimated.
On one hand, cross-section estimators rely on the assumption that individual effects are
uncorrelated with other right-hand-side variables
3. If there are some unobservable characteristics
that are correlated with the right-hand-side variables, the coefficients would be biased. As
explained in Caselli et al. [2], this assumption can be violated within the dynamic framework of a
growth regression. With a panel this problem can be solved.
On the other hand, total GDP includes the resource sector of the economy. This sector
affects total growth, especially when the share of primary exports is high. Therefore it is important
to know the behavior of the resource sector.
Table 3 shows the change over time of the per-capita production of 7 commodities. We use
per-capita production because this is what the left-hand side of equation (1) tries to capture. The
table indicates that the production of natural resources per capita has generally fallen. Only one
commodity (gold) has a growth rate in production greater than the average growth rate for the total
GDP (1.1%) in our sample of countries.
                                               
3 In a cross-section regression, there is only one t. Therefore, it is needed for hi to be uncorrelated with Xi. Then, the
total error term -xi =hi+ei- would be uncorrelated with Xi.Table 3: Commodity Production per-capita
Average Annual Growth Rate (1978-1996)
Group


















Sources: Financial Times [4], OPEC [10], and Summers and Heston [12].
a Countries that had the highest production to GDP ratio in 1978.
b
 Actual OPEC Members: Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela.
c In order of dependency: Bolivia, Malaysia, Zaire, Rwanda, Thailand, Indonesia.
d In order: Zaire, Zambia, Peru, Namibia, Ireland, Canada.
e In order: Namibia, Peru, Morocco, Zambia, Canada.
f In order: Peru, Zaire, Namibia, Chile, Mexico, Dominican Republic.
g In order: Papua New Guinea, Zambia, Zaire, Chile, Peru, Philippines.
h
 In order South Africa, Papua New Guinea, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Dominican Republic,
Philippines.
The table also depicts another fact. We divide countries in two groups: the 5 or 6 countries
where the ratio of commodity production to GDP is the highest, and the rest of the world. It is clear
that, with the exception of lead and silver, the growth rate in production of the countries with the
highest dependency has been lower than the rest of the world. These results lead one to ask the
question whether previous estimations of the effect of natural resources are just estimations of the
fall in per capita production of the resource sector.
2. A Re-estimation
For the reasons given in the previous section, in this section we reestimate Sachs and
Warner [8]. First, we will use panel estimation and then, we will use different measures of the non-
resource side of the economy.2.1. A Panel Estimation
In order to estimate a panel, we need to obtain a different data set than Sachs and Warner
[8].
4,5 Table 4 compares the result from Sachs and Warner [8]
6 with the result of doing the same
cross-section analysis using our data set. It is clear the results are statistically the same.
Table 4: Sample Selection
Dependent Variable: Average Annual GDP Growth Rate
Sachs and This
Warner Sample
Log. GDP 70 -.0134 -.0135
(-7.77) (-6.698)
Prim. Exp./GNP -.0729 -.0700
(-5.57) (-5.667)
Years Open 70-90 0.0242 0.0235
(7.60) (6.028)






All coefficents are significant at any level
We estimate a panel using alternative data sets, one with at least 2 time elements and the
other with 4 time elements. The results are shown in Table 5. The first set of regressions, from (1.1)
to (1.3), indicates that the effect is statistically significant in the cross-section of this sub-sample
but insignificant in a panel with fixed effects. The same is done in columns (2.1) to (2.3) using the
sample with 4 time elements. This allows for the presence of more observations to calculate the
fixed effect, but there are less countries with information available to do this regression. Again, the
effect is statistically significant in the cross-section –though only at the 2.5% level-- and then
insignificant in a panel with fixed effects.
                                               
4 In Appendix A, we explain in detail some sample selection issues that drive this fact.
5 In Appendix D we describe the data used for this chapter
6 The reader will note that we chose regression number (1.3) of Table 1. The reason is that the Rule of Law is a “one-
time” variable and therefore will not be useful for panel estimation, and that the Change in Terms of Trade was not
significant in column (1.4).Table 5: Effect of Natural Resources: Cross-Section vs. Panel
Dependent Variable: Average Annual GDP Growth Rate
Using sample where a panel Using sample where a panel
with T=2 can be estimated with T=4 can be estimated
Panel Panel
Cross-Sctn Pooled Fx.Ef. Cross-Sctn Pooled Fx.Ef.
Prim. Exp./GNP -.0636* -.0565* -.0015 -.0454** -.01963 .0669***
(-4.578) (-3.796) (-0.051) (-2.346) (-1.037) (1.786)
Log. GDP 70 -.0136* -.0153* -.0720* -.0154* -.0208* -.0811*
(-6.687) (-5.679) (-7.995) (-6.726) (-6.776) (-7.672)
%Years Open 70-90 .0247* .0197* -.0124 .0252* .0255* .0246**
(6.223) (3.954) (-1.043) (6.420) (5.597) (2.576)
Log. Invest./GDP 70-89 .0140* 0190* .0199** .0126* .0220* .0477*
(5.514) (5.783) (2.003) (3.715) (5.335) (4.698)
Hausman Test 63,52 50,78
F Test all ui=0 2,11 1,98
Obs 74 148 148 54 216 216
N 74 74 74 54 54 54
T 1 2 2 1 4 4
t-statistics in parenthesis.










































Figure 2: Shocks to Primary ExportsIt is important to mention that the effects of the other variables do remain significant even
after the panel is done, with the expected signs and even with the expected relative size.
7 The fact
that the impact of resource abundance disappears once fixed effects are introduced implies that this
variable is correlated with unobservable characteristics and therefore it disappears once fixed
effects are introduced.
A natural concern is to ask whether we are just estimating the fixed effects of a country's
resource richness, a fact that is time invariant. In Figure 2, we show the shocks to the share
(measured through the standard deviation) compared to the share in 1970. We see that the biggest
shocks are not concentrated on the biggest producers. On the other hand, the cross-section measures
the ranking of the countries from low exporters to high exporters. In this sample it changes from
period to period.
8
Summarizing, in the panel we see that there are no effects from primary exports change
through time, which cast some doubts on the validity of the conclusions derived from the cross-
sectional regressions.
2.2. Growth in the Non-Resource Sector
In this subsection we deal with the other issue related to the estimation of the effect of resource
abundance, namely the inclusion of the resource sector on the total GDP. For that purpose, we will
use alternative measures for the non-resource side of the economy. In general, the effect still
remains present for the cross-section but disappears with the fixed effects.
Throughout this section we will determine whether the effect found by Sachs and Warner
[8] on total GDP is still present in the sub-sample for which data is available for the non-resource
sector. Then, we estimate the effect on the non-resource measure of the economy. Finally, we
reestimate the effect on a panel. In this section we only present the results for the panels of 10-year
                                               
7 For example the coefficient on the lagged GDP is expected to be greater the shorter the period of time where growth
is measured. For an explanation see Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1].
8 See in Appendix B.periods. The reason for this is that when a panel of 5-year periods is used the negative effect of
natural resources is lost even in the cross-sections.
For the non-resource sector of the economy we construct a measure represented by the GDP
net of resource exports. Arguably, this tends to eliminate the resource sector in those countries
where the sector is large relative to the rest of the economy.
9
In Table 6, we show the cross-section results. It is clear that the effect measured by Sachs
and Warner is still present in this sub-sample. The coefficients in column (1) are actually not
significantly different from those in Table 4. Then we proceed to repeat the estimation with the
non-resource side of the economy. The results in column (2) seem to suggest that there is a negative
effect on growth in the non-resource side of the economy coming from resource abundance, similar
to the results presented in the previous subsection.
Table 6: Non-Resource Growth: Cross Section
Dependent Variable: Average Annual GDP Growth Rate
Using Using
Total GDP Non-Resource GDP
Prim. Exp./GNP -.0763 -.0643
(-5.677) (-4.409)
Log. GDP 70 -.0123 -.0130
(-6.186) (-6.002)
Years Open 70-90 0.0233 0.0275
-5.667 (6.157)






All coefficients are significant at any level
In Table 7, the results from the estimation of the effect on a panel are given. As in previous
tables, we started with the cross-section to determine whether the effect is present or not. It is, but
                                               
9 See Appendix C for alternative measures of the non-resource sector. The results are qualitatively the same.is only weakly significant.
10 Again, as in the previous estimations, the effect disappears once a
panel with fixed effects is done.
Table 7: Non-Resource GDP: Cross-Section vs. Panel
Dependent Variable: Average Annual GDP Growth Rate
Panel
Cross-Sctn Pooled Fx.Ef.
Prim. Exp./GNP -.0401** -.0351** .0061
(-2.44) (-2.061) (0.175)
Log. GDP 70 -.0126* -.0139* -.0785*
(-5.796) (-4.879) (-6.468)
%Years Open 70-90 .0261* .0256* .0008
(5.840) (4.607) (0.055)
Log. Invest./GDP 70-89 .0100* .'0117* .0007
(3.815) (3.384) (0.046)
Hausman Test 34.58
F Test all ui=0 1.27




*,**,*** imply significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level.
In the previous estimations we construct the “non-resource GDP” with the nominal share of
primary exports to GNP. If relative prices change considerably, this can affect the estimation.
Ideally, this should be corrected by using the respective deflators. However, there are no deflators
just for primary exports. For that reason, we repeat the construction of this “non-resource GDP”
taking into account changes in relative prices using the deflator for total exports compared to the
GDP deflator. It can be expected that the deflator for total exports captures the change in prices for
primary exports in countries where primary products are the main export. For purposes of
abbreviation, we will call this variable the “real” non-resource growth.
11
The cross-section estimations are shown in Table 8. Column (1) shows that the effect is still
present in this sub-sample. Then, in column (2), we see that the negative effect persists on the
                                               
10 Both p-values are actually lower than 2.5%.
11 This does not mean that the previous measure of “net-of-exports” GDP was nominal. It was also based on the real
GDP, but without taking into account the change of relative prices inside a country.“real” non-resource side of the economy, even with a bigger impact than in any other previous
estimation.
Table 8: "Real" Non-Resource Growth: Cross-Section
Dependent Variable: Average Annual GDP Growth Rate
Using Using
Total GDP Non-Resource GDP
Prim. Exp./GNP -.0535 -.1117
(-3.585) (-2.959)
Log. GDP 70 -.0114 -.0259
(-5.617) (-5.036)
Years Open 70-90 0.0226 0.0569
(-5.396) (5.377)






All coefficents are significant at any level
The next step is to do the panel estimations. There are two different ways to do this
regression: one is to continue to use the nominal share of primary exports to GDP as an explanatory
variable, and the other is to use the real share. Both are used in Table 9. These alternative measures
have different interpretations: the former measures the “windfall” effect, while the latter measures
the presence and activity of a resource sector. In other words, a shock in the first one will measure a
price windfall, while a shock in the second one will measure the discovery of new reserves.Table 9: "Real" Non-Resource GDP: Cross-Section vs. Panel
Dependent Variable: Average Annual GDP Growth Rate
Panel
Using nominal shares Using "real" shares
Cross-Sctn Pooled Fx.Ef. Pooled Fx.Ef.
Prim. Exp./GNP -.0894** -.0210 .0456 -.0378*** .0678***
(-2.326) (-1.042) (1.396) (-1.705) (1.810)
Log. GDP 70 -.0249* -.0134* -.0884* -.0141* -.08271*
(-4.748) (-3.956) (-8.763) (-4.190) (-8.105)
%Years Open 70-90 .0529* .0259* -.0032 .0260* -.0043
(4.899) (3.809) (-0.220) (3.981) (0.295)
Log. Invest./GDP 70-89 .0172* 0100* .0101 .0107* .0061
(2.870) (2.454) (0.694) (2.687) (0.4428)
Hausman Test 69,29 85.09
F Test all ui=0 2.26 2.29
Obs 56 112 112 112 112
N 56 56 56 56
T 4 4 4 4
t-statistics in parenthesis.
*,**,*** imply significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level.
As in the previous regressions, we start with the cross-sections to check whether the effect is
present in the sample or not. In order to compute the real shares, a base year has to be chosen. We
chose 1970; for that reason we only need to do one cross-section. In Table 9 we see that the effect
is present in the respective cross-sections --although weak
12 However, it disappears in both panels.
Moreover, the result from column (3.2) suggests a positive sign.
13
As in subsection 2.1, there is the concern that once we control for changes in relative prices,
the only fixed effect is whether a country is resource rich or not, and that variable does not change
over time. For that reason, in Table 10 we show the shocks to the “real” primary exports. We see
that it is similar to Figure 2, in that the biggest shocks are not concentrated on the biggest
producers. On the other hand, there is also a shift in the ranking of the countries.
14 This reflects the
                                               
12 The actual p-value is 2.4%.
13 These results also appears in Appendix C.
14 See Figure II in Appendix B.facts presented in the introduction of this section, where we show that the production of
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Figure 3: Shocks to "Real" Primary Exports
In this subsection we reestimate the resource curse, using different approaches to measure
the non-resource side of the economy. We have found that there is a negative effect present in the
cross-section but not in the panels. As in subsection 2.1, the fact that the effect of resource
abundance disappears once fixed effects are introduced implies that this variable is correlated with
unobservable characteristics and therefore it disappears once fixed effects are introduced.2.3. Dividing Resources by Origin
An important question to ask is whether the effect is the same for all kinds of primary
exports. Primary exports add agricultural, food, mineral and fuel exports together. Clearly, these are
very different products with different profitability, different behavior over time, etc. We divide
exports into account so in Table 10.
In column (2) we divide primary exports between agricultural
15 and non-agricultural
exports. In column (3) we divide the non-agricultural exports into minerals and fuels. The table
shows that once exports are divided into categories, they have different effects
. This reinforces the
idea that using non-resources GDP is the right approach to see the effects of resource abundance.
Table 10: Dividing Exports by Origin












Log. GDP 70 -.0130* -.0121* -.0127*
(-6.002) (-5.851) (-6.004)
Years Open 70-90 0.0275* 0.0247* 0.0265*
(6.157) (5.717) (5.891)
Log. Invest./GDP 70-89 0.0090* 0.0113* 0.0110*
(3.349) (4.273) (4.178)
N 66 66 66
Hausman Espification Test 23.22 7.88
p-value 0.000 0.096
Adj. R
2 0.56 0.61 0.61
t-statistics in parenthesis.
*,**,*** imply significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level.
                                               
15 Agricultural exports include raw materials and food.However, this result has the same properties as all of the previous results in this research. In
Table 11, we show that, as in Section 2.1, once a panel with fixed effects is done, the effect
becomes insignificant.
Table 11: Effects of Different Resource Exports: Cross-Section vs. Panel





Non-Agr.Exp./GNP -.0899* -.0499* .0079
(-4.319) (0.722) (1.151)
Agricultural Exp./GNP .0026 .0211 .1011
(-2.448) (-2.794) (0.227)
Log.GDP -.0117* -.0128* -.0747*
(-5.814) (-4.502) (-5.965)
%Years Open .0222* .0225* .0054
(5.231) (4.004) (0.339)
Log.Inv./GDP .0127* .0134* .0010
(5.062) (3.874) (0.063)
Hausman Test 10.23
F Test all u=0 1.20




*,**,*** imply significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level.
3. New Dimensions of the “Curse”
The previous section makes clear that important econometric inconveniences are present in the
original formulation of the "curse". There are two striking facts that can be derived from the
previous exercises: First, in all specifications, when fixed effects are included, invariable the
natural resource curse disappears. Second, however, also in almost all specifications the curse
exists in the cross-sectional.
In this section, we tackle this second fact: why we have the effect in the cross-section. An
explanation could be that most of the source of variation is found in the cross-sectional and not onthe time series variation. A second one, already mentioned above, the coefficient in the cross-
section may be reflecting the fact that there is a correlation between omitted variables and resource
abundance. In this section we will attempt to find those omitted variables.
The first step is to see which are the countries driving the results. We are going to use the
specification in column (3) of Table 10 given that the result is clearly driven by non-agricultural
exports. For that reason, in Figure 4, we plot the residuals of doing that regression with all variables
but the non-agricultural exports against those non-agricultural exports. We see clearly two groups
of countries: one that almost draw a “cone” on the upper left hand side and other on the lower right
hand side of the graph, that seems to be the group of countries driving the results.
First candidates.
In this sub-section, we show that the results are not driven by de degree of development, nor by the
quality of the institutions,
A first intuitive explanation is to argue that the cross-section is estimating a difference
between developed economies and non-developed economies. In Table 12 we repeat the regression
done in column (3) of Table 10, and then divide the sample between OECD countries and non-
OECD countries. At the bottom of the table are some summary statistics for the share of primary




































































Figure 4: Residuals and Non-Agr. Primary Exports
Non-OECD countries have a higher share of primary exports. On the other hand, this
variable does not seem to have an effect on growth in OECD countries. However, there is less
variance in the share of primary exports in OECD economies. Also we see that the variable is still
significant in non-OECD countries. Consequently, this variable is not just estimating a difference
between OECD and non-OECD economies.
An alternative is to check for variables that measure the institutional setting of a country.
We are going to focus on the variable that tries to measure the quality of bureaucracy.
16 
17 This
variable is measured between 0 and 6. A high value means low bureaucracy quality. Since it is
                                               
16 See Appendix F for a complete description of this variable.
17 In Appendix D we repeat the regressions from this section with alternative institutional variables. These variables are
intended to describe corruption, rule of law, risk of expropriation and risk of government repudiation. There is a
problem with these variables however: The methodology to construct them is the same for all. For that reason we do
not introduce all of them in the same regression.
These other variables usually have the expected sign but their significance level is lower.usually measured at a point in time, this variable can be used in panels only before the introduction
of fixed effects.
Table 12: Grouping Countries




Non-Agr. Exp./GNP -.1081* -.0211 -.1089*
(-5.407) (-0.390) (-4.116)
Agr. Exp./GNP -.0287 -.0234 -.0334
(-1.583) (-1.212) (-1.352)
Log. GDP 1970 -.0121* -.0148* -.0114*
(-5.851) (-4.203) (-4.898)
%Years Open 0.0247* .0161* .0284
(5.717) (3.672) (4.501)
Log. Invest./GDP (Averge 79-90) 0.0113* .0132*** .0107*
(4.273) (2.0271) (3.922)
N 66 21 45
Adj. R
2 0.61 0.73 0.62
t-statistics in parenthesis.
*,**,*** imply significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level.
Non Agr. Exp/GNP. Distribution in sub-sample
Sample Mean .0377 .0180 .0470
Std. Dev. .0688 .0195 .0810
Min. .0000 .0015 .0000
Max. .3654 .0590 .3654
In Table 13, we present the results from the cross-section and a panel before the fixed
effects. We also included in the table a variable that measures ethno-linguistic fractionalization.
This comes from La Porta et al. [5].
18 The idea is to introduce a variable that represents an
“exogenous” institutional setting, since it is argue that rents coming from the resource sector might
have an impact on the institutional setting.
                                               
18 See Appendix D.Table 13: Resource Abundance and Institutions
Dependent Variable: Average Annual GDP Growth Rate
for Non-Resource Growth
Cross-Section Panel (Pooled)
(1.1) ´(1.2) (1.3) (2.1) ´(2.2) (2.3)
Non-Agr./GNP -.1222* -.1070* -.1040* -.0381** -.0329*** -.0220
(-4.862) (-4.090) ´(-3.876) ´(-1.899) ´(-1.644) (-1.074)
Agricultural/GNP -.0470*** -.0519** -.0531** -.0461 -.0537 -.0509
(-1.903) (-2.132) (-2.157) (-1.351) (-1.580) (-1.523)
Bureaucracy -.0023*** -.0025*** -.0032*** -.0035**





Log.GDP -.0106* -.0130* -.0139* -.0141* -.0177* -.0219*
(-4.449) (-4.795) (-4.363) (-4.519) (-4.809) (-5.235)
%Years .0213* .0172* .0175* .0247* .0197* .0210*
(4.531) (3.337) (3.351) (4.471) (3.207) (3.459)
Log Inv./GDP .0085*** .0066 .0064 .0092*** .0070 .0069
(1.952) (1.500) (1.430) (1.776) (1.334) (1.326)
Obs 53 53 53 94 94 94
N 47 47 47
T 2 2 2
t-statistics in parenthesis.
*,**,*** imply significant at the 1, 5 and 10 % level.
In the table, we see that the effect of the primary exports disappears once institutional
variables are introduced in the panel, while it remains significant in the cross-section. The
difference between those regressions is that in the panel we allow for the fluctuations of the
primary exports over time, while in the cross-section primary exports are only going to divide the
sample into resource-rich and resource-poor countries. Therefore, the cross-section indicates that
there exists a difference between countries driven by their resource abundance.
Credit Contraints and Debt Overhang
The previous exercises indicate that neither the classification of countries into developed and
developing countries, nor the introduction of institutions change the basic result that the negativeeffect is present on the cross-section. In this sub-section, we present evidence that the results on the
"curse" are mainly due to credit constraint considerations.
Giving a further look to Figure 4 indicates that the countries that are driving the result has
gone either trough an International Monetary Fund and/or a World Bank Program (including Debt













































Figure 5: Debt Growth and Resource Abundance
The previous regressions were done using the period 1970-1990. As seen in Figure 6, during
the 70´s, commodity prices were high and might have induced resource abundant countries to use
them as collateral. Then, the 80’s saw a fall in commodity prices leading to a debt crisis, which
most of these countries faced.
Figure 6 shows the evolution of commodity prices of Coal, Copper, Iron and Oil. The prices
are the nominal prices, where (for comparison reasons) they have been normalized to be equal to100 in 1970. As can be seen, during the mid-70's the increases in commodity prices were quite










1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Coal (Bitum.) Copper (elect.) Iron Ore Crude Oil
Figure 6: Commodity Prices
In Table 14, we present the change in the prices every five years. Note between 1970-1975
coal, natural gas, and iron experienced price increases that doubled their prices. Moreover, in 1975-
1980 oil and natural gas experienced their own “boom”. Coal is perhaps the most stable price in
this sample, but still its priced increase by 60 percent in the last five years of the decade of the 70's.
During the first 5 years of the 80's, coal, natural gas, iron and oil experienced an important
slowdown in their price increases to finish the decade with falls. Copper is the only exception who





Iron Ore Crude Oil
1970-75 207.6% 163.2% 10.3% 98.2% 76.2%
1975-80 27.3% 253.3% 57.8% 70.8% 185.6%
1980-85 2.4% 57.9% -33.9% 13.2% 11.6%
1985-90 -13.5% -31.9% 83.6% -26.2% -16.9%
If investment and debt decisions in the late 70's were based on the recent estimated price
increases, then it should become clear that during the first slow down in the early 80's the countries
had problems rolling over their debts. This motivates the regressions found in Table 15.
In the table, we divide the sample in two periods: 1970-1980 and 1980-1990. From the
table, it is clear that the share of non-agricultural exports at the beginning of the period did not have
an effect on growth from 1970 to 1980. Nevertheless, they have a negative from 1980 to 1990.
However, in column (3) we changed it to the share of non-agricultural exports in 1970. We see that
the coefficient is higher
19 and the significance of the regression is higher.
We go a step further and construct a variable called credit constraint, which is the
Debt/GNP ratio in 1981 for less developed countries (LDC’s) and zero (0) for developed countries.
We then repeat the regression done in column (3) including this variable. The result shows that
non-agricultural exports no longer have a negative effect and rather this credit constraint ratio have
a negative effect on growth. This implies that the resource abundance variable was picking the fact
that these countries were highly indebted at the beginning of the decade
20.
                                               
19 The p-value for a t-test that they are different is 0.083.
20 In Appendix E, we also test jointly this explanation with alternative explanations to the “curse”. The results confirm
the results find here.Table 15: Natural Resources and Credit Constraints
Dependent Variable: Average Annual GDP Growth Rate
Period: 1970-1980 Period: 1980-1990
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-Agr. Exp./GNP 1970 -.0525 -.1385* -.0314
(-1.256) (-3.385) (-1.452)
Non-Agr. Exp./GNP 1980 -.0571*
(-2.683)
Credit Constraint (1981) -.0524*
(-2.954)
Log. GDP (Beginning of Period) -.0091** -.0159* -.0171* -.0206*
(-2.199) (-3.988) (-4.396) (-5.087)
%Years Open .0233* .0230** .0258* .0205**
(3.166) (2.500) (2.988) (2.376)
Log.Invest./GDP (Average of the Period) .0077 .0189* .0199* .0205*
(1.540) (3.700) (4.015) (4.279)
Agr. Exp./GNP .0674*** -.0366 -.0421 -.0303
(1.746) (-0.790) (-0.943) (-0.701)
N 58 58 58 58
Adj. R
2 0.23 0.37 0.42 0.45
t-statistics in parenthesis.
*,**,*** imply significant at the 1, 5 and 10 % level.
4. Conclusions
This paper considers several reasons behind the perceived poor performance of resource-
intensive economies. It reestimates the effect of natural resource abundance on growth using panel
data and improved measures of the non-resource side of the economy. We found that the effect is
always present in the cross-section data and not in the panel data. We argue that the empirical
finding in the cross sectional is due to omitted variable biases.
We thoroughly examine the possible candidates to explain the cross sectional results. We
found that degree of development and the quality of institutions were important determinants of the
growth, however, they were not the cause of the "curse"On the other hand, we show that it is due to the fact that these countries decided to take
advantage of high commodity prices on the 70’s to use them as implicit collateral and found
themselves on a debt overhang when commodity prices fell in the 80’s.
Therefore, rather than a problem associated with the presence of natural resources, these
result seems to point out to credit market imperfections as reason for bad performance. If we think
of the commodity production of a country as part of their collateral, an increase in prices relaxes the
degree of credit constraint allowing those governments to increase their foreign debts. During the
slow down in prices and the subsequent fall, the countries were unable to continue to borrow and
had to repay part of their debts. In the end, devaluations and other contractionary measures had to
be taken to balance the current accounts, with their usual toll on growth.
Our reading of the evidence is that the curse of natural resources is not due to the particular
aspect of excessively depending on natural resources what slows down the growth rates. It is the
interaction between credit markets and a collateralizable good that is experiencing a bubble, what
causes the problems in the end. In this respect, a boom-bust cycle in a commodity price is no
different from a bubble in stock markets, as was the case of Japan, or a bubble in real estate prices,
as was in New England and Thailand.
Our interpretation is that the curse of natural resources, in this data, is another example of
the curse on asset prices bubbles. Future research should continue to explore the interaction of
credit market imperfections and the determinants of the growth. Finally, extending the present




In their paper, Sachs and Warner change the base year for which the share of primary exports is
computed for 16 countries. The reasons behind those changes range from including more countries
in the sample, to including primary exports missing in National Accounts, to excluding “refinery
countries” (countries that export fuels because they import fuels to refine). As we argue in section2, the problem that arises from those changes is that, the correct regression would be a panel.
Therefore, we will always need “beginning of period measures” of the share of primary exports.
In  Table 16  we show the steps we take to solve this problem.
Table 16: Sample Selection
Dependent Variable: Average Annual GDP Growth Rate
This Sample
With Modified Countries Without
Sachs and Full Prim. Exp/GDP Modified
Warner Sample can be calculated Countries
(1) (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (3.1) (3.2)
Log. GDP 70 -.0134 -.0127 -.0134 -.0121 -.0135 -.0135
(-7.77) (-7.021) (-6.996) (-5.581) (-6.697) (-6.698)
Prim. Exp./GNP 70 -.0729 -.0584 -.0722 -.0700
(Sachs and Warner) (-0.242) (-5.029) (-5.894) (-5.666)
Prim. Exp./GNP 70 -.0344 -.0700
(This Sample) (-2.970) (-5.667)
Years Open 70-89 .0242 .0260 .0232 .0257 0.0235 0.0235
(7.06) (7.403) (6.234) (6.074) (6.028) (6.028)
Log. Investment/GDP 70-89 .0102 .0133 .0144 .0131 0.0140 0.0140
(5.63) (6.018) (5.768) (4.616) (5.539) (5.540)
N 87 95 82 82 78 79
Adj. R
2 0.67 0.64 0.66 0.54 0.64 0.65
t-statistics in parenthesis.
All coefficents are significant at any level
First, in column (1.1) we have the results reported by Sachs and Warner. Then, column (2.1) uses
my entire sample, but the share of primary exports, which is taken directly from Sachs and Warner
[8]. As can be seen the coefficients are not significantly different from (1.1). The same regression is
then repeated in column (2.2), but only for those countries for which we would be able to compute
the share of primary exports. Again, the coefficients are not significantly different to those in (1.1).
The next step is to do the same regression but now using my computed share of primary exports.
We see that the coefficient in the share of primary exports changes substantially. This may be due
to the presence of those countries for which Sachs and Warner changed the share of primary
exports. Therefore, in columns (3.1) and (3.2) we repeated regressions (2.2) and (2.3), respectively,
without the countries that Sachs and Warner modified. It is clear that the coefficients in (2.1) and
(3.2) are not significantly different nor are they significantly different from the original Sachs and
Warner results in (1.1). For that reason we are going to use this group of countries.B. Change in Primary Exports
Figures I and II compare the share of primary exports and “real” primary exports to GNP in
1970 and 1980. They illustrate that there are important changes in the shares. They also illustrate,
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Figure II: Change in the Share of Exports
C. Alternative measure of Non-Resource GDP.
The World Bank provides data on some sectors of countries' economies, in particular
manufacturing and services. In this subsection we estimate the effect of resource exports on the
combined GDP --as a proxy for the non-resource sector.
In Table 17, we present the results from a cross-section of countries. From the result for the
total GDP, we see that the result from Sachs and Warner is present in this regression. In thesectorial data, we find that we still get a negative effect from primary exports.
21 This seems to
suggest that there is the predicted negative effect.
Table 17: Manufacturing and Services GDP
Dependent Variable: Average Annual GDP Growth Rate
Using Using
Total GDP Non-Resource GDP
Prim. Exp./GNP -.0604 -.0659
(-4.790) (-2.744)
Log. GDP 70 -.0157 -.0108
(-7.061) (-2.418)
Years Open 70-90 .0302 .0316
(6.781) (3.363)






All coefficents are significant at any level
In Table 18, we proceed to reestimate the effect with a panel. It indicates that once a panel
with fixed effects is done, the negative effect of primary exports is lost. Consequently, it seems that
there is no evidence of a negative effect from resource abundance in the growth of non-resource
sectors.
                                               
21 This result is also found by Sachs and Warner [8] in their paper. See Table VIII, column (8.2). However, in Manzano
[6], the sectors are divided looking for evidence of “Dutch Diesease” and it is found that the negative effect is found on
the service sector and not in the manufacturing sector, contrary to what it is expected from the “Dutch Disease”
literature.Table 18: Manufacturing and Service GDP: Cross-Section vs. Panel
Dependent Variable: Average Annual GDP Growth Rate
Panel
Cross-Sctn Pooled Fx.Ef.
Prim. Exp./GNP -.0780* -.0430** .0882***
(-2.860) (-1.958) (1.815)
Log. GDP 70 -.0080*** -.0152* -.0619*
(-1.835) (-4.160) (-5.412)
%Years Open 70-90 .0309* .0290* -.0146
(3.261) (3.819) (-0.886)
Log. Invest./GDP 70-89 .0001 .0101 -.0076
(0.195) (1.439) (-0.483)
Hausman Test 50.02
F Test all ui=0 2.27




*,**,*** imply significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level.
D. Alternative Institutional Variables
In Table 19, we repeat the estimation done in the cross-sections of Table 13, with other
institutional variables. These variables represent a corruption index, a rule of law index, an index
that tries to capture the risk of government repudiation, and another the tries to capture the
expropriation risk.
22 It is clear that these variables are not statistically significant, while the non-
agricultural resource abundance variable continues to be significant in the regression.
                                               
22 See Appendix E for a complete description of the variables.Table 19: Alternative Institutional Variables
Dependent Variable: Average Annual GDP Growth Rate
for Non-Resource Growth.
Cross-Section
(1.1) (1.2) (2.1) (2.2) (3.1) (3.2) (4.1) (4.2)
Non-Agr./GNP -.1129* -.1110* -.1079* -.1053* -.1242* -.1246* -.1275* -.1282*
(-3.483) (-3.171) (-3.307) (-2.949) (-3.782) (-3.436) (-3.925) (-3.546)
Corruption .0011 .0012
(0.7089) (0.7709)
Rule of Law .0025 .0026
(-1.424) (1.417)
Gov. Repudiation 0.0015 .0015
(0.903) (.8944)
Exp. Risk .0007 .0007
(.4501) (.4340)
Fractionalization -.0027 -.0034 .0004 .0007
(-0.362) (-0.471) (.0396) (.0710)
Log.GDP -.0118* -.0124* -.0135* -.0144* -.0089* -.0087*** -.0090* -.0087
(-3.887) (-3.579) (-3.887) (-3.665) (-2.934) (-1.766) (-2.883) (-1.711)
%Years .0195* .0197* 0.0178* .0181* .0198* .0198* .0215* .0215
(3.866) (3.838) (3.645) (3.622) (3.078) (3.039) (3.433) (3.384)
Log Inv./GDP .0074 .0072 .0058 .0056 .0075 .0075 .0074 .0075
(1.602) (1.524) (-1.139) (1.059) 1.350 (1.2717) (1.319) (1.220)
Agricultural/GNP -.0555 -.0584 -.0491 -.0500 -.0485 -.0482 -.0513 -.0508
(-1.670) (-1.671) (-1.546) (-1.517) (-1.195) (-1.092) (-1.275) (-1.146)
N 53 53 53 53 36 36 36 36
Adj. R 0.57 0.57 0.59 0.58 0.55 0.53 0.54 0.53
t-statistics in parenthesis.
*,**,*** imply significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level.
E. Robustness Check.
In this appendix we test together our reading of the resource “curse” and alternative
explanations to it. In Table 20, we present the result of repeating the regressions found on Table 15,
but adding institutional performance. The degree of financial development should be correlated
with rule of law and the quality of the bureaucracy. In this regression, we test for the robustness in
our results regarding the credit constraint results.Table 20: Credit Constraints and Institutions
Dependent Variable: Average Annual GDP Growth Rate
Period: 1970-1980 Period: 1980-1990
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-Agr. Exp./GNP 1970 -.1032** -.0848*** -.0537
(-1.827) (-1.842) (-1.144)
Non-Agr. Exp./GNP 1980 -.0430**
(-2.090)
Credit Constraint (1981) -.0405**
(-2.027)
Bureaucracy .0024 .0029 .0032c .0024
(0.893) (1.272) (1.403) (1.097)
Log. GDP (Beginning of Period) -.0095*** -.0243* -.0233* -.0269*
(-1.733) (-5.434) (-5.151) (-5.717)
%Years Open .0204** .0197** .0202** .0190**
(2.198) (2.358) (2.398) (2.338)
Log.Invest./GDP (Average of the Period) .0022 .0144 .0127*** .0149**
(0.262) (2.134) (1.916) (2.298)
Agr. Exp./GNP .0368 -.1161* -.1062** -.0958**
(0.721) (-2.777) (-2.554) (-2.373)
N 47 47 47 47
Adj. R
2 0.25 0.44 0.43 0.47
t-statistics in parenthesis.
*,**,*** imply significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level.
As can be seen, the resource curse survives the inclusion of bureaucracy. The same
conclusion as before is found: The effect of primary exports disappears when credit constraint
variables are included in the regression.
A second robustness check is to find how sensitive the results are to other variables that
explain growth. In particular, resource abundance could be negatively correlated with many
different variables that are used to explain growth
23. In table 21, we test for one of them, Education.
Which, indeed, it is negatively correlated with resource abundance. As seen in the Table the results
from Table 15 do not change with the introduction of it.
                                               
23 We thank Bill Easterly for pointing us this fact.Table 21: Credit Constraints and Education
Dependent Variable: Average Annual GDP Growth Rate
Period: 1970-1980 Period: 1980-1990
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-Agr. Exp./GNP 1970 -.0300 -.1411* -.0720
(-0.697) (-3.145) (-1.420)
Non-Agr. Exp./GNP 1980 -.0786*
(-3.048)
Credit Constraint (1981) -.0518**
(-2.512)
Sec. Enrollment (Beginning of Per.) .0040 .0057 -.0015 .00357
(0.861) (1.076) (-0.287) (0.673)
Log. GDP (Beginning of Period) -.0120** -.0195* -.0158* -.0226*
(-2.049) (-3.773) (-3.137) (-4.115)
%Years Open .0255* .0243* .0269* .0224**
(3.356) (2.671) (3.013) (2.594)
Log.Invest./GDP (Average of the Period) .0059 .0147** .0184* .0171*
(1.540) (2.474) (3.005) (2.924)
Agr. Exp./GNP .0645 -.0554 -.0365 -.0360
(1.653) (-1.151) (-0.789) (-0.820)
N 55 55 55 55
Adj. R
2 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.43
t-statistics in parenthesis.
*,**,*** imply significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level.
In Table 22 we test for another variable used to explain growth, financial development,
measured as M2 to GDP Ratio. It is also negatively correlated with resource abundance. As seen in
the Table financial development is indeed significant, and has a positive effect on growth.
However, the results from Table 15 still do not change with the introduction of it. This exercise can
be repeated with several other variables standard in growth regressions and the results hold.Table 22: Credit Constraints and Education
Dependent Variable: Average Annual GDP Growth Rate
Period: 1970-1980 Period: 1980-1990
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-Agr. Exp./GNP 1970 -.0301 -.1221* -.0694
(-0.678) (-2.715) (-1.432)
Non-Agr. Exp./GNP 1980 -.0472**
(-2.046)
Credit Constraint (1981) -.0453**
(-2.285)
M2/GDP .0202 .0425** .0414** .0400**
(0.965) (2.154) (2.182) (2.218)
Log. GDP (Beginning of Period) -.0121** -.0189* -.0194* -.0227*
(-2.490) (-4.011) (-4.267) (-4.984)
%Years Open .0232** .0133 .0141 .0115
(2.474) (1.201) (1.330) (1.139)
Log.Invest./GDP (Average of the Period) .0067 .0191* .0204* .0216*
(1.278) (3.446) (3.781) (4.206)
Agr. Exp./GNP .0867** .0129 .0062 .0129
(2.071) (0.229) (0.116) (0.252)
N 45 45 45 45
Adj. R2 0.26 0.38 0.43 0.48
t-statistics in parenthesis.
*,**,*** imply significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level.
F. Description of the Data
(i) Total Gross Domestic Product: Growth rates and logarithms of past values are per
economically active population. It is calculated using the gross domestic product per capita
constructed by the methodology developed in Summers and Heston [11] and updated in
Summers and Heston [12]. This number is divided by the share of the economically active
population in the total population given in World Bank [13].
(ii) Primary Exports/GNP, Agricultural Exports/GNP and Non-agricultural Exports/GNP:
Calculated by using the primary exports and GNP figures given in World Bank [13].(iii) Years Open: Percentage of years open in the period of reference. The number of years open is
based on the criteria used in Sachs and Warner [6] to determine whether a country is open or
not in a certain year.
(iv) Investment/GDP: Calculated using the values provided by Summers and Heston [12].
(v) Manufacturing and Services GDP: calculated using the figures of GDP described in (i) and the
shares of the sectors given in World Bank [13].
(vi) Non-Resource Sector: Calculated using the data described on (i) and (ii).
(vii) “Real” Non-Resource Sector and “Real” Primary Exports Share: calculated using the data
described in (i) and (ii) and the ratio of the deflators for merchandise exports and GDP given in
World Bank [13].
(viii) Bureaucracy: Calculated using the Index of Bureaucracy Quality from Keefer, Philip and
Stephen Knac (1995), ``Institutions and Economic Policy: Cross-Country Tests Using
Alternative Institutional Measures'', Economics and Politics, VII, 207-227 (cited by Sachs and
Warner [9]). The variable in this paper is equal to 6 (maximum possible value) minus the
actual value of the index. A lower value means a higher quality of bureaucracy.
(ix) Fractionalization: Ethno-linguistic fractionalization. Taken from La Porta et al. [5].
(x) Credit Rationing: Total External Debt divided by the GNP for the countries which this ratio is
available in World Bank [13]. These countries are all less developed countries. For OECD’s
countries this variable was set to zero (0).
(xi) Secondary Enrollment: Percentage of the age group attending secondary school. Taken from
World Bank [13].
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